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How does the domestic political climate within democratic states affect the duration of their foreign military
engagements? To answer this question we combine a rationalist model of war termination with a theory about how
partisan politics affects the policy preferences of national leaders to predict the duration of democratic military
interventions. Specifically, we examine how changes in a chief executive’s public approval ratings interact with
partisanship to affect decisions about the timing of conflict termination. We test our expectations on a set of 47
British, French, and American cases from a new dataset of military interventions by powerful states. Our results
suggest that partisanship mediates the effect of public approval on the duration of military operations initiated by
powerful democratic countries. As executive approval declines, governments on the right of the political spectrum
are inclined to continue to fight, while left-leaning executives become more likely to bring the troops home.
By stepping up the American military presence in Iraq,
President Bush is not only inviting an epic clash with the
Democrats who run Capitol Hill. He is ignoring the
results of the November elections . . .
—Sheryl Gay Stolberg, New York Times, January 11,
2007
In March of 2003, after the onset of the current U.S.
military intervention in Iraq, President Bush’s job
approval ratings soared to over 70%. After one year
of fighting in Iraq, the president’s approval ratings
hovered around 50%. By the third year of the war,
the percentage of the public approving of the pres-
ident’s job performance had fallen into the 30s.
President Bush’s approval ratings never exceeded
41% and frequently dipped into the 20s for the
remainder of his term. As early as June of 2005, a
bipartisan group of representatives introduced a joint
resolution (HJ Res 55) requiring the President to
implement a plan for the withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Iraq. In a March 2006 ABC News/Washington
Post survey, 57% of respondents thought the war in
Iraq was not worth the cost and well over a majority
believed the United States should begin to withdraw
its troops. Even the troops deployed in Iraq expressed
doubts about the mission. In a February 2006 poll
conducted by Zogby international, only 23% of the
soldiers polled agreed that U.S. troops should stay as
long as necessary to achieve American objectives
while 29% said they thought U.S. troops should
withdraw ’’immediately.’’
Yet, the conflict in Iraq persisted. Rather than
withdrawing U.S. military forces and ending the
intervention, President Bush responded to declining
public support with a public relations campaign
designed to convince the public that the administra-
tion has a strategy for victory in Iraq. On January 10,
2007, President Bush defied the recommendations of
a bipartisan Congressional panel’s assessment of U.S.
policy in Iraq and escalated the United States’
commitment, announcing plans to send 21,500 more
troops to Iraq.
In this study, we ask a straightforward question:
how does the domestic political climate within
democratic states affect the duration of their foreign
military operations? In particular, we examine how
changes in a chief executive’s public approval ratings
interact with partisanship to affect decisions about
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the timing of conflict termination. Our theoretical
framework combines a rationalist approach to war
termination decision making with a theory about
how partisan politics and public opinion affect the
policy preferences of national leaders. We test our
expectations using event history analysis with the
population of military interventions initiated by
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States
between 1960 and 2000 from a new dataset of major
power military interventions.
Our study fills a gap in the literature on the nexus
of domestic politics and international conflict. A
significant body of literature explores the relationship
between public approval and democratic leaders’
decisions to use military force abroad. Numerous
studies find that the use of force affects public
support for national leaders. Other research shows
that public opposition to or support for the use of
military force abroad can influence whether a leader
decides to use force in a particular situation. How-
ever, this literature focuses almost exclusively on the
onset of militarized disputes or wars, and ignores how
changes in public support for the chief executive
affects conflict prosecution after the conflict has
begun. The choice between war and peace is not a
one-shot decision, but rather a continuous series of
decisions with countless opportunities to escalate,
sustain, deescalate, or terminate the fighting. If foreign
policy success and failure affects the chief executive’s
public support—and public support is important to
maintaining office—we should expect changes in lead-
ers’ job approval ratings to influence, not only decisions
to use force, but also subsequent decisions about
prosecuting and terminating military commitments.
Our study provides one of the first systematic,
cross-national tests of how executive approval and
partisan politics influence the duration and outcome
of foreign military interventions. While studies of
U.S. public opinion and foreign policy behavior
dominate the empirical research, we look at the
relationship between public support for the govern-
ment in power and conflict trajectories in three
major power democracies. We find evidence that
changes in the level of public support for a chief
executive affect the timing of conflict termination.
However, consistent with our hypotheses, the polit-
ical orientation of the government in power con-
ditions the effect of shifts in executive approval.
Governments of the left become more likely to
withdraw their military forces as their job approval
ratings decline while right party executives become
less likely to terminate military interventions as their
popularity declines.
Public Opinion and the Use of
Military Force
One major theme of research concerned with the
connection between public support for national
leaders and foreign military involvement has been
the ‘‘rally effect’’ presidents frequently enjoy when
they use military force abroad. Although Lian and
Oneal (1993) conclude that, on average, presidential
approval does not change following foreign military
operations, Brody (1991), Jordon and Page (1992),
Mueller (1973), and Page and Brody (1972) all find
that presidential approval often spikes when the
president uses force abroad. More broadly, Ostrom
and Simon (1985) show the U.S. public rewards the
chief executive for tough military and foreign policy
stances. And Oneal, Lian, and Joyner (1996) find that
American presidents get a popularity boost from the
public when they respond forcefully to aggression.
A related literature on diversionary war explores
hypotheses about the effects of domestic political
incentives to use military force abroad. However,
empirical tests of the effect of U.S. presidential
popularity on leaders’ propensity to initiate the use
of military force provide contradictory results. A
significant amount of recent research concludes there
is no direct relationship between low job approval
ratings and foreign conflict involvement (DeRouen
2000; Fordham 2002b; Meernik and Waterman 1996;
Mitchell and Moore 2002). But some studies have
found evidence that declining approval rates among
the public increase the probability of engagement in
military action abroad (DeRouen 1995; Foster and
Palmer 2006), while other scholars have found that
the use of military force is more likely when public
approval of the president is relatively high (James and
Hristoulas 1994; James and Oneal 1991), or high but
declining (Meernik 2000; Ostrom and Job 1986).
While there is mixed evidence about whether
leaders deploy military troops to boost flagging appro-
val ratings, only a handful of studies have explored the
effects of the domestic political climate on conflict
trajectories after the troops have been deployed. Sobel
(2001), for example, finds that public opinion affects
the timing and duration of U.S. military interven-
tions. Meernik & Brown (2007) find some evidence
that, contrary to their expectations, higher levels of
presidential approval decrease the duration of U.S.
military engagements. While democratic publics may
rally around the executive when deploying military
troops, maintaining public support over the course
of extended military engagements is difficult. Public
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approval of a war effort generally declines as the
human and material costs of the war mount. As costs
mount public discussion in the media and among
elites becomes more critical (Baum 2000; Brody 1991;
Gartner and Segura 1998; Larson 1996; Mueller
1973). The longer a conflict persists, the greater the
human and material costs incurred by all parties and
the larger its potential impact on leaders’ political
fortunes (Bennett and Stam 1996; Bueno de Mesquita,
Koch and Siverson 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and
Siverson 1995; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Meernik
and Brown 2007).
In the next section we discuss a simple model of
war initiation and termination. We then develop
a theory about how partisan accountability and
changes in public approval influence leaders’ recur-
ring decisions about whether to sustain or terminate
their foreign military commitments. We test the im-
plications of this theory for the duration of foreign
military operations using data on British, French, and
American military interventions since 1960.
Theory
Like many other scholars, we view violent conflict as a
bargaining process. Belligerents use force to change
their opponent’s beliefs about the probability and/or
cost of victory in an attempt to coerce their opponent
into settling on more favorable terms (Wagner 2000).
All else equal, the probability that a state will make
concessions to terminate a war increases when the
leader’s estimate of the cost of attaining the state’s war
aims increases, or the leader’s estimate of the likelihood
of victory decreases (Goemans 2000; Slantchev 2004).
War fighting is tremendously costly. Using mili-
tary force results in the loss of economic resources,
material, and human lives, and these costs can have
political repercussions for national leaders. Public
support for the chief executive is likely to suffer as
casualties mount and the public begins to doubt the
war effort is progressing toward victory (Feaver and
Gelpi 2004; Gartner and Segura 1998; Mueller 1973).
However, while most scholars focus their attention
on the political costs of fighting,1 choosing to
terminate a war can also be politically costly for
leaders. To terminate a war, leaders must often make
some concessions to their adversary’s demands or
lower their own demands so that a negotiated
settlement becomes possible. After sinking blood
and treasure into a conflict, a leader who terminates
a conflict without attaining the state’s war aims may
suffer a diminished international reputation for
strength and resolve. At home, doubts about her
competency can emerge, diminishing the leader’s
prospects for remaining in office (Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2003; Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001).
All else equal, the longer a leader can sustain the
state’s war efforts, the better the eventual settlement
for that state. However, fighting longer also increases
the human and material cost of war, which can erode
the executive’s domestic political support. After
deploying the troops, leaders face a daily trade-off
between the cost of continuing to fight and the cost
of ending military operations on less favorable terms.
In the next section, we explain how the partisan-
ship of the chief executive affects a leader’s prefer-
ences in the face of this dilemma. We then generate
testable hypotheses about the interactive effect of
executive partisanship and executive approval on the
likelihood that a leader terminates rather than sus-
tains or escalates a conflict.
Partisanship and Conflict
Prosecution
We present a theory of partisan accountability and
foreign policy outcomes to explain why some leaders
continue to fight while others terminate conflict
under seemingly similar circumstances. We argue
that executives primarily seek to satisfy the subset
of the population whose support they must secure to
remain in office—their ‘‘winning coalition’’—rather
than trying to satisfy all constituents. Because of the
size of the winning coalition, democratic leaders must
provide public goods to satisfy their winning coali-
tion so that they, or their party, can retain office
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). While democratic
leaders must satisfy a broader constituency than
nondemocratic leaders, they focus their efforts on
their party and its partisans because this segment of
the electorate makes up the largest proportion of
their winning coalition. As Morgan and Bickers
(1992) argue, erosion of support within their coali-
tion concerns executives more than erosion of sup-
port among those who are not part of their domestic
support base. Because elected leaders enact policies to
satisfy the coalitions that keep them in office,
1Filson and Werner (2007) is an important exception. The
authors distinguish between sensitivity to the costs of fighting
and sensitivity to making concessions. Their model suggests that
the two sensitivities can have contradictory effects on the
initiation, duration, and outcome of wars.
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examining the partisan base of support of presidents
and prime ministers can help us predict what types of
policies executives will prefer.
We draw on recent research providing evidence
that, even when a broad national consensus exists on
the primary foreign threat or issue, partisan differ-
ences exist over foreign policy preferences (Fordham
2002a).2 Holsti (2004), for example, finds that while
there was broad public support for the first Persian
Gulf War after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 1991,
rather substantial partisan differences still existed.
And while there is wide variability in policy prefer-
ences within parties, in general, contemporary right-
party constituents tend to be more focused on
preserving access to foreign markets and resources
and increasing national security (Boix 1998), while
left party identifiers primarily prioritize domestic
issues such as welfare, redistribution of resources,
employment, and health care (van der Brug 2001).
Because wars divert resources away from the domes-
tic policy priorities of left party constituents, govern-
ments of the left may be more sensitive to the
domestic political costs of using force abroad (Koch
2009; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004).
Our own plausibility probes with public opinion
data from the United Kingdom, France, and the
United States reveal several trends. In a sample of
38 surveys conducted during U.S. military interven-
tions between 1973 and 1999, Republicans were
significantly more likely to support sustaining on-
going military operations than Democrats. In Na-
tional Election Surveys (NES) conducted between
1980 and 2004, fewer than 9% of Republicans, but
more than 24% of Democrats expressed a preference
for lower defense spending. British Election Surveys
(BES) conducted in the United Kingdom between
1983 and 1992 reveal comparable trends; almost 30%
of Labour party supporters thought the government
should spend less on the military, while only 11% of
Conservatives wanted lower defense spending. Fi-
nally, according to a series of IFOP polls in France,
clear partisan differences emerged over Algerian
independence, the use of force over the Suez Canal,
and the development of independent strategic nuclear
capabilities. In each case, parties on the right took a
more hawkish stance.
Evidence also exists that left and right govern-
ments adopt different military and foreign policies.
At least since the Vietnam War, parties with con-
servative political ideologies have tended to empha-
size a strong or expanded military presence at home
while liberal parties have leaned toward a diminished
military presence (Eichenberg 1989; Schultz 2001). In
Western European democracies, ‘‘conservative’’ par-
ties are more likely than ‘‘liberal’’ parties to support
increasing military spending and expanding the
country’s military presence abroad (Klingemann,
Hofbert, and Budge 1994). And several studies con-
clude that conservative governments are more likely
to use force in the international arena than are more
liberal governments (Foster and Palmer 2006; Koch
2009; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004).
Because of the preferences and priorities of their
core constituents, we expect the domestic political
cost of expending blood and treasure in a foreign
military contest to be lower for right party leaders
than for left party leaders. At the same time, right
party constituents are more likely to punish leaders
for making concessions to end a war. As a result,
when facing a trade-off between a shorter war with a
less favorable settlement and a longer war with
greater gains, right party leaders may be safer choos-
ing the latter. Left-leaning governments, on the other
hand, are more at risk of alienating their base of
support by sustaining the use of military force
abroad. All else equal, the constituency of left-leaning
executives is likely to prefer a less favorable war
outcome to a protracted military engagement.
Partisanship, Executive Approval,
and Conflict Termination
While not every executive decision is made with an
eye on the polls, executive approval is important to
national leaders. High approval ratings facilitate
executives advancing their policy agendas (Bond
and Fleisher 1990; Rivers and Rose 1985; Rohde
and Simon 1985). An executive’s popularity has a
strong bearing on the likelihood of reelection (Brody
and Seligman 1983; Erickson 1989). And, in parlia-
mentary systems, executive approval correlates directly
with expected gains and losses in party seat share in the
next legislative election (Jacobson 1992; Kernell 1977;
Tufte 1975). Mueller (1973) suggests that approval
reflects a process whereby the president’s winning
coalition ‘‘sheds’’ various minority coalitions over time
during a war. As an executive’s base of support erodes,
2The foreign policy preferences of political parties of the right
and the left have changed over time. Numerous scholars argue
that there was a significant partisan realignment during the
Vietnam War in the United States (see, for example, Holsti
2004; McCormick & Wittkopf 1990; and Sigelman 1979). Our
argument and findings should be considered historically
contingent.
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she and her party face less favorable election odds and
it becomes more difficult to accomplish other political
goals.
Because of this threat of defection, governments
should be cautious about adopting or maintaining
policies that are inconsistent with the preferences of
their partisan constituents when overall public ap-
proval is low. Leaders with high levels of public
support can afford to initiate and sustain policies that
may not be as popular with their core constituents
(Meernik and Brown 2007). Because low approval
ratings constrain governments, they may hope to
rally supporters by changing policies that are unpop-
ular with their base.
Decision makers do not have complete informa-
tion about the military capabilities or resolve of their
adversaries when deciding whether to initiate a
military intervention. As a result, they may use
military force and then find attaining their original
objectives is more costly than originally expected.
Leaders then face a trade-off between the costs of
continuing to fight and the domestic political costs of
‘‘quitting’’ short of victory. We argue that whether
terminating or sustaining a foreign military operation
is a safer response to low levels of public approval
depends on the partisan ideology of a leader’s core
constituency. As their public approval ratings decline,
executives from right-oriented political parties should
become less likely to terminate a foreign military
intervention, while left-leaning executives should be-
come more likely to bring the troops home.
We expect that right party executives can sustain
the support of their core constituency over a longer
duration, even if the prospects for victory decline. At
the same time, right-party constituents are more
likely to punish leaders for failing to achieve victory.
Therefore right-party leaders are less likely to with-
draw their country’s military troops from combat
short of victory (i.e., ‘‘quit’) when faced with low
domestic approval rates.
H1: Chief executives from parties on the political right
become less likely to terminate a military mission
short of victory as public approval declines.
Left-leaning governments, on the other hand, risk
alienating their base of support by continuing mili-
tary interventions with poor prospects for success.
When overall public approval levels are low, left party
leaders are more likely to cut their losses and
withdraw.
H2: Chief executives from parties on the political left
become more likely to terminate a military mission
short of victory as public approval declines.
Research Design
We estimate Cox competing risks proportional haz-
ards models with time-varying covariates to examine
how approval and partisanship affect the duration of
foreign military interventions conducted by demo-
cratic states. By using the Cox model we avoid any
parametric assumptions about the shape of the base-
line hazard, although the model does impose a
proportional hazard assumption. The trade-off is
between efficiency and ease of interpretation (the
parametric model) and avoiding misspecification
(the Cox model) (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
2004). Our cases consist of all military interventions
initiated by France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States between 1960 and 2000 and are from
the Military Intervention by Powerful States (MIPS)
dataset (Sullivan and Koch 2009). The MIPS data
defines a military intervention as a use of armed force
that involves the official deployment of at least 500
regular military personnel (ground, air, or naval) to
attain immediate-term political objectives through
action against a foreign adversary. There are 47
interventions against both state and nonstate adver-
saries during the time period under investigation.3
The unit of analysis is the military intervention-
month.
Major power military interventions are ‘‘wars of
choice’’ in the sense that the major powers face no
immediate threat to their homeland or political
survival and can choose whether to initiate, and
when to terminate, from these foreign engagements.
As a result, we can meaningfully discuss the duration
of these interventions in terms of the intervening
state’s decision to persist or withdraw. In a broader
population of cases we would need to consider the
possibility that the conflict initiator could be ren-
dered incapable of continuing to fight—or that the
initiator might want to negotiate an end to the
conflict but not able to because the other actor would
not agree to stop fighting (Goemans 2000). In the
cases we examine, the major powers were never
militarily defeated or fighting to defend their home-
lands, so it is appropriate to view the timing of
intervention termination as largely determined by the
intervening state. The duration of the interventions
3There are 21 U.S., 13 British, and 13 French interventions. The
models in this paper are estimated on 46 cases because we drop
one intervention (an operation by French paratroopers to take
out the Bokassa regime in the Central African Republic) that lasts
less than two days. The effects of our key independent variables
are robust to the inclusion of this case.
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ranges from one month to 128 months. The mean
duration is almost 16 months (15.8), while the
median duration is six months.
We employ a competing risks modeling strategy
because military interventions can end in more than
one way. While we are only interested in the effects of
partisanship and approval on the propensity of
governments to withdraw from foreign engagements
short of victory (i.e., ‘‘quit’’), about 63% of the
military interventions in our dataset are terminated
after the intervening state attains its primary political
objective (the definition of ‘‘winning’’ employed in
the MIPS dataset). We observe only one type of
termination for each military intervention, but we
assume that every military intervention has the
potential to end in either intervening state victory
or withdrawal and that, conditional on the inde-
pendent variables, the hazards are independent. We
estimate separate models for the hazard of quitting
and prevailing, treating failures due to the alternative
termination type as right-censored in each model.
However, because we do not have any theoretical
expectations about the effects of partisanship and
approval on the probability of victory in war, we
focus on substantive interpretation of only the with-
drawal equation. The intervening state quits in fifteen
and prevails in 29 of the 46 intervention cases in our
dataset. We observe a total of 793 intervention-
months.
Our two primary independent variables are the
partisan orientation of the executive and public
approval of the executive. We create a dichotomous
variable labeled Right Executive. For the United
States, right executive is coded as 1 when the president
is Republican. For the United Kingdom, right execu-
tive is coded as 1 when the Prime Minister is from the
Conservative party. For France right executive is
coded as one when the President is a member of
the Gaullist party or one of its successor parties. To
code Executive Approval we use monthly Gallup data
on presidential approval for the United States. French
approval data, which are similar to U.S. presidential
approval data, are from TNS Sofres. For the United
Kingdom, we use monthly prime minister satisfaction
data drawn from British Political Facts (Butler and
Butler 2000) and Gallup. We lag the executive
approval variable by one month so we capture the
effects of changes in approval on decisions to sustain
or terminate an intervention in the following month.
Because we are interested in how the political
orientation of the chief executive conditions the effect
of approval, we interact right executive with executive
approval.
Control Variables
To control for possible selection effects that link
initial conditions to subsequent outcomes we create a
variable (Start Approval) that indicates the level of
executive approval in the month before the state
initiates the use of force. We also create a trichotomous
measure of initial public support for the military
intervention (Initial Support). Using public opinion
surveys, as well as news accounts and secondary
sources, we code each intervention as having active
support, no dissent, or active dissent.4
Regardless of their own political orientation,
leaders may find it easier to terminate military
engagements, especially failing foreign interventions,
if they are of a different party than the government
that started the intervention. A dichotomous variable
labeled Party Change indicates the partisanship of the
government in a particular intervention-month is
different from the partisanship of the government
that made the initial decision to deploy troops. The
partisanship of a country’s chief executive changes
during seven of the interventions.
Election cycles may also affect public approval,
the strength of an executive’s desire to manipulate
approval, and policy choices. To control for the effect
of elections on the duration of military interventions
we create a variable labeled Election Timing that is
equal to the number of months remaining until the next
mandated election. We use data from Woldendorp,
Keman, and Budge (2001) to determine when the next
mandated election will occur.
We include monthly measures of economic per-
formance because executive approval is often a function
of how satisfied the electorate is with economic con-
ditions (Brace and Hinkley 1991) and because a
number of studies suggest that economic conditions
have a direct impact on decisions to use force (e.g.,
DeRouen 2000; Ostrom and Job 1986; Oneal and Tir
2006; Russett 1990). French economic data are from the
Institut National de la Statistique e des Etudes Econo-
miques. British economic data are from the United
Kingdom’s Office of National Statistics. Economic data
for the United States are from the Federal Register of
the United States. We employ lagged, monthly meas-
ures of the unemployment rate and inflation.
To account for attributes of the military inter-
ventions that might be correlated with intervention
4We employed survey results where possible. However there are
very few surveys about support for most of the interventions in
the 1960s. To discern whether there was support or dissent, we
examined whether there was editorial debate in the major
newspapers over the intervention in its initial stages.
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duration and government partisanship or approval
rates, we include several control variables. The
manner and intensity of force employed is likely to
affect the duration and outcome of military inter-
ventions, as well as the chief executive’s job approval
ratings (Goemans 2000; Gartner & Segura 1998).
While tracking changes in casualty rates and troop
numbers would be ideal, reliable data are not avail-
able at a monthly level of analysis for most of the
interventions. Instead, we create several different
variables to capture these attributes. First, we create
a measure of the initial number of troops deployed
(Initial Troops). We also include a measure of addi-
tional troops deployed. The variable Force Change is
the difference between the largest troop commitment
of the intervention and the initial force deployed. We
log these measures given expectations of declining
marginal effects for each additional soldier. To
control for how costly a particular foreign engage-
ment is, we create a variable that measures the
average number of battle deaths the intervening state
suffers per month over the course of the intervention
(Casualties). We also code whether the major power
received assistance from another major power and
whether the target was nonstate actor. We call these
measures Coalition and Non-State Target respectively.
We supplement the MIPS data with events data from
three sources to create two measures that vary over
the course of the interventions. The variables MP
Hostility and Target Hostility measure the average
level of hostile activity one actor directs toward the
other in a given month using events data from the
KEDS (Gerner et al. 1994), WEIS (Goldstein 1992),
and COPDAB (Azar 1993) datasets.5 We lag both MP
Hostility and Target Hostility by one month.
Military intervention duration may also vary with
the nature of the major power’s war aims (Stam 1996;
Sullivan 2007). At the same time, partisanship may
affect the type of objectives a government chooses to
pursue by using force and the issues at stake in the
intervention should affect public approval (Jentleson
1992). We create a measure of the issue at stake using
Jentleson and Britton’s (1998) Principle Policy Ob-
jective (PPO) types and the MIPS dataset’s objective
variables. According to Jentleson and Britton, Foreign
Policy Restraint (FPR) is defined as ‘‘the use of force
to coerce an adversary engaged in aggressive actions
against the United States’’ (1992, 397). Internal
Political Change (IPC) is defined as the use of force
to try to ‘‘engineer internal political change in a
government whether as support for the existing
government or overthrowing a government consid-
ered an adversary’’ (397). The third category, Hu-
manitarian Intervention (HI) is defined as ‘‘ The
provision of emergency relief through military and
other means to people suffering from famine or other
gross and widespread humanitarian disasters’’ (399).
Finally, we create two dummy variables indicat-
ing when either France or Britain is the intervening
state. These variables help to control for the possi-
bility that the three democracies have different base-
line hazards of withdrawal from foreign military
engagements. Including these variables allows us to
capture the effects of factors that may be unique to
each country without specifying a laundry list of
attributes. In addition to including the intervening
state dummies as covariates, we estimate each of the
models clustering on intervening state to account for
non-independence among interventions conducted
by a single major power.
Results
Table 1 presents results from estimation of Cox
competing risks proportional hazards duration mod-
els. In Models 1 and 1a, the dependent variable is the
duration of an intervention until the intervening state
‘‘quits’’ (withdraws without attaining the state’s
primary political objective). In this model, interven-
tions that ended because the major power attained its
primary political objective (prevailed) are treated as
right-censored. The Cox proportional hazards model
parameterizes the hazard rate h(t) in this manner,
h tjXið Þ5 h0 tð ÞeXib where h0(t) is an unspecified non-
negative function of time. This is the baseline hazard.
Xi then is a covariate matrix for subject j where one or
more of the covariates can vary across time.
A positive coefficient indicates an increase in the
risk of intervention termination (decreasing inter-
vention duration) and a negative coefficient indicates
that an increase in that variable reduces the termi-
nation hazard. We test the proportional-hazards
assumption for each model with estimated Schoen-
feld residuals and find that none of the variables in
either model violates the assumption.6
Model 1 contains only our key explanatory
variables: the chief executive’s public approval rate
5The KEDS data and WEIS data use the same scale, with events
given a score ranging from 11 to 223 (higher numbers mean
more conflictual behavior). However, the COPDAB data ranges
from 1 to 14. Therefore, we recalibrated each so that the range is
between 250 to 50 with higher number representing more
conflictual and less cooperative behaviors (see appendix).
6All results not displayed in the paper are available in the web
appendix.
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in the previous month, the partisanship of the chief
executive, and the interaction of approval and parti-
sanship. The results from this simplified model
provide strong evidence for our hypotheses. Right
party chief executives are less likely than left party
executives to terminate a foreign military interven-
tion in a given intervention-month when faced with
low domestic popularity. As public approval rates
decline, governments of the right become more likely
to continue fighting and less likely to bring the troops
home. For executives from parties on the left of the
political spectrum, the risk of withdrawal is high
when public approval is low, but left party executives
become more likely to sustain military operations as
their job approval ratings increase. Figure 1 illustrates
the change in the relative hazard of ‘‘quitting’’ for
right and left party executives as public approval of
the executive increases from 30% to 80%.7 The
relative hazard of withdrawal from a military inter-
vention short of victory is approximately equal for
right and left party executives when between 45 and
55% of the public expresses approval of the chief
executive. When less than 45% of the public approves
of the chief executive, left party leaders are signifi-
cantly more likely than right party leaders quit in the
following month. Conversely, leaders from the polit-
ical right have a low risk of withdrawal from a
military intervention when public approval is low,
but they significantly become more likely than left
party leaders to cut their losses and bring the troops
home when their popularity exceeds 55%.
In Model 1a, we include our control variables.
We also present hazard ratios for all the coefficients
in column 3 of Table 1. The hazard ratio for
dichotomous variables is the ratio between the
predicted hazard for a member of one group and
that for a member of the other group, holding
everything else constant. For continuous variables,
the same interpretation applies to a one unit differ-
ence. The hazard ratio is calculated by taking the
antilog of the coefficient. The first thing to note is
that the coefficients on our key independent variables
retain their signs and remain significant at p, .001.
TABLE 1 Cox Competing Risks Proportional Hazard Models: Duration until Major Power withdraws from
intervention
Coefficient
Z
Score Coefficient
Z
Score
Hazard
Ratios
Right Party Executive 25.16*** (4.84) 217.083*** (7.71) 3.8e-08
Executive Approval 20.060*** (5.09) 2.268*** (10.74) .764
Right x Approval 0.104*** (6.85) 0.342*** (9.19) 1.41
Initial Approval Rate .158*** (4.29) 1.17
Party Change 1.19* (1.89) 3.28
Months to Election 2.027* (2.06) .973
MP Hostility Level .073*** (4.70) 1.08
Target Hostility Level 2.071*** (3.89) .931
Initial Forces 21.1e-04*** (5.80) .999
Additional Forces 2.556*** (7.20) .573
Coalition 1.61*** (3.61) 4.99
Non-state Target 2.55*** (3.44) 12.82
Initial Support .152 (.20) 1.16
Humanitarian 22.04* (1.79) .129
Internal Political Change 22.86* (1.79) .057
Unemployment .048 (.10) 1.04
Inflation .022 (.14) 1.02
FRA 21.98** (2.56) .137
UK 21.38 (.64) .214
Failures 15 15
N (Intervention-Months) 793 793
Robust z statistics ***p , 0.001, **p , 0.01, *p , 0.05
7The relative hazard of quitting means that in the model the
hazard rates for two observations are proportional to one another
and that proportionality is maintained over time. Mathematically
the relative hazard for two observations in the data i and j obey
the following relationship:
h0 tð ÞeXib
h0 tð ÞeXjb 5
eXib
eXjb
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In addition, the magnitude of the effect of executive
approval increases appreciably for both right and left
party executives in the more specified model. We use
the estimates from Model 1a to calculate changes in
the risk of withdrawal as partisanship and approval
change holding all other variables constant at their
mean values. As public approval declines by one
standard deviation (about 10 points, centered on the
mean) the risk of withdrawal decreases by 52% for
right party leaders. For left party leaders, the risk of
quitting is thirteen times higher following a 10-point
drop in public approval.
Although monthly unemployment levels and
inflation rates do not appear to directly affect the
timing of decisions to withdraw from a foreign
military engagement, many of the control variables
in Model 1a are significant. The higher an executive’s
public approval rates when the troops are deployed,
the more likely the executive is to withdraw from the
intervention short of victory. High public approval
may make leaders more risk acceptant—increasing
the likelihood they will select themselves into military
engagements they cannot sustain to victory. At the
same time, if the party holding the office of the
executive changes during a military intervention, the
risk of unilateral withdrawal more than doubles.
National leaders may find it easier to disengage from
failing foreign interventions if they are of a different
party than the government that initiated the inter-
vention. But it is also likely that public dissatisfaction
with a failing war effort increases the probability that
the party that initiated the war will be replaced. The
negative coefficient on the election timing variable
suggests that the further away the next election, the
less likely the executive is to withdraw from an
ongoing military commitment. Moving a month
closer to the next mandated election increases the
hazard of withdrawal by approximately 3%. Although
a number of unmeasured factors could account for
divergence in the risk of withdrawal across countries,
differences in the presidential term and executive
constraints may partially account for why France
appears to have a lower hazard of terminating a
military intervention short of victory than the United
States.
Turning next to the variables specific to the
conflict, our measures of both major power and
target hostility levels are significant. An increase in
target hostility decreases the likelihood of withdrawal.
However, holding all other variables constant, an
increase in the level of hostility displayed by the
intervening state leads to an increase in the hazard of
the intervention ending in failure in the following
month. These results provide some evidence for a
‘‘gambling for resurrection’’ phenomenon, although
it is difficult to confirm this dynamic with data at this
level of aggregation. When faced with losing an
intervention, governments may escalate the conflict
in a last-ditch effort to win—or at least not lose
(Downs and Rocke 1994). Our measure of the cost of
fighting in a particular engagement—the average
number of battle deaths the intervening state suffered
per month over the course of the intervention—was
not significant either as an additional control variable
FIGURE 1 Predicted Relative hazard of ‘‘Quitting’’ by Executive Orientation
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or when included in the model instead of the hostility
level variables.8
While the level of initial support for a military
intervention does not change the expected duration
of an intervention or the timing of withdrawal, both
higher initial troop deployment levels and greater
increases in troop numbers over the course of an
intervention decrease the risk of quitting. For exam-
ple, in a given intervention month, an intervening
state is 21% less likely to withdraw from an inter-
vention in which it initially deployed 3000 troops
than from an intervention in which only 1,000 troops
were initially committed. Not surprisingly, it seems
that committing more troops to a foreign military
intervention makes withdrawing more difficult. This
result also suggests that troop commitment levels
may be an indicator of the salience of the issues at
stake for the intervening state.9 In contrast, the co-
efficient on the coalition variable is positive. It appears
to be easier for a state to withdraw from an inter-
vention when other major powers are engaged—
possibly because quitting with allies is less damaging
to a leader’s domestic reputation or because states can
withdraw their troops from a coalition effort without
jeopardizing their security if their allies remain
engaged.
We expected some types of military engagements
to be more popular than others and for military
intervention duration to vary with the nature of the
major power’s adversary and war aims. To measure
war aims, we include the variables Internal Political
Change and Humanitarian Intervention in the
model, with Foreign Policy Restraint as the compar-
ison category. Both are negative and significant
suggesting that, all else equal, major power interven-
tions to influence the composition of foreign regimes
and peacekeeping operations tend to be longer than
interventions to counter aggressive actions taken by
foreign adversaries. Our results also suggest that the
risk of withdrawal from a military intervention short
of victory in any given month is significantly higher
when the adversary is a nonstate actor as opposed to
another state.
Robustness Tests
In order to test whether our results are unduly
influenced by one or two unique or extreme cases,
we estimated Model 1 14 separate times, excluding
one of the failed interventions each time. The sub-
stantive effects and statistical significance of our
explanatory variables did not change. We also esti-
mated Model 1 for each country separately to see if
the results varied significantly by country. While the
coefficients were no longer significant due to the
small number of cases, they remained signed in the
same direction. The coefficients were also similar in
magnitude for the U.S. and U.K. cases while the
French coefficients were larger in magnitude.
As a final robustness check, we estimate a model
using a measure of change in support for the
executive among members of the executive’s party
for the U.S. and U.K. interventions.10 The new
measure takes on a value of zero at the beginning
of the intervention and when an executive of a
different party takes office. The remaining values
are the previous month’s executive approval among
partisans minus the initial level of support for the
executive among party members. Our expectation is
that declining partisan support for right executives
will decrease the hazard of quitting while declining
partisan support for left-leaning governments will
increase the hazard of quitting.
We have fewer cases given the lack of French
data, therefore we exclude those measures that were
not significant in Model 1a in order to preserve as
many degrees of freedom as possible. Table 2 presents
these results. Both right executive and the interaction
term are significant, while the change in approval
measure for left party leaders is in the expected
direction but insignificant. Figure 2 displays the
marginal effect of executive partisanship on the
hazard of quitting as support for the incumbent
among his or her partisans changes.
Figure 2 shows there are significant differences in
the hazard of quitting for governments of the left and
right when partisan support declines. As approval of
the executive decreases among his or her party
members, right party governments become less likely
to withdraw from a foreign military intervention
without attaining the state’s primary war aim, and
8Because this variable is relatively highly correlated with the
intervening state’s hostility level and including it does not change
the substantive effects of our explanatory variables, we do not
include it in the model presented in Table 1.
9An alternative measure of issue salience, which codes conflicts
over territory or governance as more highly salient than conflicts
over policy or humanitarian abuses, is not statistically significant
as a control variable in Model 1a and including it does not
significantly alter the coefficients on our key independent
variables.
10We are unable to obtain executive support by partisanship for
the French cases. For U.S. executive support we use Gallup
approval ratings broken down by partisanship. For the U.K. data
we relied on National Opinion Polls from the U.K. data archive,
Gallup polls, and MORI polls. Polls from the 1960s ask for a
respondent’s vote intentions rather than partisanship.
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the difference in the risk of withdrawal for right and
left increases. When support for a government among
its own partisan constituents has fallen 10 points
below its level at the beginning of a military inter-
vention, left-leaning executives are about 2.6 times
more likely than right party executives to bring the
troops home.
Model 2 provides additional evidence that left
and right party executives respond to public approval
ratings differently. But this model also highlights the
importance of declining, rather than simply low
executive approval levels. Two recent examples of
executives involved in military interventions that do
not appear in our dataset illustrate the distinction.
Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003,
President Bush’s approval ratings hovered around
58%. By the end of April, they had climbed to
approximately 70% as the United States made quick
work of the Iraqi army. However, as the intervention
continued, Bush’s ratings declined, dropping to
below 40% by December 2005. The President’s
approval ratings remained low, sometimes dipping
into the 20s, for the rest of his term. As we would
expect, the Republican president was steadfastly
committed to sustaining the war effort for the
remainder of his presidency.
In contrast, at first glance Prime Minister Blair’s
policy towards Iraq appears to be at odds with our
predictions. Blair—a left party executive—chose not
to withdraw British troops from Iraq despite approval
ratings in the 30s. However, both Model 1 and Model
2 predict low relative hazard rates for Blair because
support for the prime minister was already in the low
30s prior to the commitment of British troops to
military operations in Iraq (Clarke et al. 2009). In
fact, MORI polls suggest that Blair’s approval stopped
declining over the course of the intervention. If the
prime minister’s approval rates had been as high as
President Bush’s initially, a decline to approval in the
FIGURE 2 Marginal effect of Quitting: by Executive Orientation and Incumbent Partisan Support.
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TABLE 2 Cox Proportional Hazard Models:
Duration until Major Power withdraws
from intervention, by change in
incumbent party support.
Model 2
Right Party Executive 2.584** (2.90)
Change in Support 2.085 (.59)
Right x Change in Support 0.148** (2.43)
Initial Approval Rate .040 (1.60)
Party Change .112 (.05)
Election Timing .002 (.05)
MP Hostility Level .052 (1.35)
Target Hostility Level 2.080*** (8.61)
Initial Forces 24.3e-05* (.97)
Total Forces 2.413* (1.98)
Non-state Target .961* (1.71)
Failures 10
N (Intervention-Months) 643
Robust z statistics ***p , 0.001, **p , 0.01, *p , 0.05
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low 30s would have dramatically increased the risk
that Blair would withdraw British troops from Iraq.
Conclusion
The analyses presented above provide evidence that
partisan politics affects the policy preferences of
national leaders and ultimately influences the dura-
tion of military interventions. We observe a strong
relationship between domestic levels of approval for
the chief executive and the timing of decisions to
terminate foreign military interventions, but the
direction of the effect varies with the partisanship
of the chief executive. Overall, our results add to the
mounting evidence that domestic politics extends
well beyond the water’s edge. Even after a country
becomes involved in a war, political contests at home
for control of the government have direct conse-
quences for the foreign policies of democratic states,
including the prosecution of conflicts already under-
way. As the United States’ current wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan demonstrate, both war fighting and war
termination entail costs and risks for political leaders.
The choice between sustaining a foreign military
operation and bringing the troops home may depend
largely on the anticipated consequences of each
course of action for the security and prosperity of
the state. However, domestic political concerns about
sustaining public approval also appear to have a
significant effect on the timing of military interven-
tion termination. In their quest to retain power,
governments of the left and right have different
audiences to satisfy when they take office and their
foreign policy choices reflect this. The electoral
dilemmas that governments face when attempting
to satisfy their constituents appear to bleed into the
foreign policy realm.
This analysis builds on previous attempts to
move beyond a democracy/nondemocracy dichot-
omy, adding depth to our understanding about
how domestic politics affects conflict processes. Ear-
lier research has suggested that democracies are more
likely than nondemocracies to prevail in the wars they
fight, but that their war-fighting advantages decline
over time (Bennett and Stam 1998). Our results
suggest that some democratic governments are more
inclined than others to withdraw from foreign mili-
tary engagements short of achieving their war aims.
Moreover, deteriorating domestic political conditions
can provide either incentives to sustain the fight or
incentives to terminate a foreign military interven-
tion depending on executive partisanship. We find
executives from parties of the political right are less
likely to terminate foreign military interventions
when public approval of their job performance is
low. But left party leaders become more likely to
terminate foreign military interventions as their
domestic popularity declines, even if they must
withdraw short of victory.
A significant body of scholarship in international
relations argues that democratic political institutions
make leaders more sensitive to the human and
material costs of using military force. Our results
suggest that the extent to which democratic leaders
are constrained by the costs of war varies widely.
Leaders whose winning coalition is largely composed
of constituents from parties on the right of the
political spectrum appear to be less constrained by
the costs of war fighting and more anxious to avoid
termination of a war effort short of victory. The
opposite is true for leaders whose base of support is
on the left of the political spectrum.
These findings are consistent with conclusions
drawn by other scholars: low levels of public approval
appear to constrain the foreign policy options avail-
able to chief executives, while high levels of support
give leaders the freedom to engage in more costly and
risky policy pursuits (Foster and Palmer 2006; James
and Oneal 1991; Ostrom and Job 1986). Robust job
approval ratings allow left party executives to sustain
foreign military interventions for longer durations,
while high domestic approval ratings allow right
party governments to terminate military engagements
more quickly.
This analysis is one of only a handful of quanti-
tative studies that tackle an enormously complex
phenomenon—the timing of leaders’ decisions to
terminate their foreign military engagements. By
combining a rationalist approach to war termination
with a theory about how partisan politics affects the
policy preferences of national leaders, we provide
insight into why some military interventions by
powerful democracies continue in the face of declin-
ing odds of victory while others are brought to a swift
conclusion. However, because of the complex and
reciprocal nature of the relationship between public
opinion and foreign policy, there is still a great deal of
work to be done.
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